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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In the perfect-competition aggregate production function framework emigration triggers a static
welfare loss for remaining individuals as the marginal productivity of immobile complementary
factors declines. Skill-biased emigration (a brain drain) may add a dynamic loss if the source
country’s average human capital falls.
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) show that the total stock of migrants from poor Southern
countries in the rich OECD has grown from about 19 million people in 1990 to 31 million in
2000. Moreover, the average rate of high-skilled emigration has been 6.6 percent in 1990 and 7.2
in 2000, with higher numbers for least-developed countries.
Theory papers discuss channels which may mitigate this brain drain. Besides remittances,
migration prospects may increase the incentives for higher education, so that average human
capital in the non-migrant population may actually rise. Moreover, a diaspora may improve
access to foreign markets, thereby encouraging international trade or investment. However,
Lucas (2006) concludes that “the empirical evidence on each of these ... channels remains
highly controversial. The most systematic portion of this evidence looks at the links between
migration and trade, though difficulties eliminating spurious associations remain” (p. 373).
Spurious association arises due to confounding factors that determine both, the volume of
bilateral trade and the bilateral stock of migrants. For example, cultural proximity matters
for bilateral trade volumes, but may also affect emigration rates. Similar considerations apply
for the ease of geographical mobility. If unobserved components of cultural and geographical
proximity positively affect migration, OLS estimates would suffer from endogeneity bias and
overestimate the true effect of migration on trade.
We include the bilateral stock of migrants into a theory-grounded gravity equation. Recent
data on the stock of emigrants from poor sending countries comes from Docquier and Marfouk.
The data has a time dimension and distinguishes between three different educational classes.
The panel nature of the data allows to account for unobserved heterogeneity by differencing
out unobserved country-pair specific characteristics. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) have recently
shown the advantages of this approach in a comparable gravity context. Moreover, we can
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perform a regression-based test for strict exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002).
We report three major results. First, failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity indeed
leads to overestimation. Second, there is, nevertheless, a statistically and economically significant
causal effect of migration on trade. Third, low- and high-skilled migrants strongly boost bilateral
trade by comparable quantities while medium-skilled migration does not seem to matter.
So far, empirical gravity studies have typically focused on a single anchor country, see the
survey of Wagner et al. (2002). Dunlevy (2006) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) document a
pro-trade effect of migration on the exports of US states. Kugler and Rapoport (2007) analyze
how emigration into the US fosters capital formation; Docquier and Lodigiani (2006) extend
this exercise to a cross-section of host countries. The two latter papers use the same data than
ours; however, we seem to be the first to exploit the temporal and bilateral dimensions of the
data in a theory-grounded South-North gravity model.
2 Econometric specification
We augment the theory-based gravity framework described in Feenstra (2004) with the bilateral
stocks of migrants. We strive to explain the volume of trade Tsnt between a (poor) Southern
sending country, s, and a (rich) Northern receiving country, n, at time t ∈ {1990, 2000}. We
investigate the effect of MIGksnt, the stock of foreign-born residents from s in n by education k
(k ∈ {l,m, h}, l: low-skilled, m: medium-skilled, and h: high-skilled).
Our gravity equation is
lnTsnt =
∑
k∈{l,m,h}
βk lnMIGksnt + γPROX
′
sn + δPOL
′
snt + νst + νnt + εsnt, (1)
where the vector PROXsn collects indicators of cultural and geographical proximity, and
POLsnt measures time-variant bilateral trade policy. We include a comprehensive set of country-
and-time effects νst and νnt to control for all source and destination specific determinants, in
particular for multilateral resistance terms.1
1Baltagi et al. (2003) explain the importance of country-and-time interactions in panel gravity equations.
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We impose the error structure εsnt = csn + usnt, where csn is a dyad-effect and usnt the
usual idiosyncratic error term. In the presence of unobserved confounding factors explanatory
variables will be correlated with the error term usnt so that OLS is invalid. Following Baier
and Bergstrand, we difference equation (1) to eliminate csn. As suggested by Wooldridge (p.
285), in a two-period framework we can test whether the differenced version of (1) satisfies
the assumption of strict exogeneity E (∆usn|∆Xsn) = 0, where ∆Xsn is the vector of first
differences of all explanatory variables. We include the stocks of foreign-born residents in the
differenced version of equation (1) and perform an F-test for joint significance. Failing to reject
the null would signal that differencing has indeed solved the endogeneity concern.
3 Data and empirical results
We use bilateral data on international migration by education for the years 1990 and 2000 col-
lected by Docquier and Marfouk. The trade data has been assembled and provided by Feenstra
et al. (2005).2 We focus on a balanced panel of low-income Southern sending countries and
high-income Northern receiving countries.3 Our sample covers more than 92 percent of total
South-North migration.
Geographical (distance, contiguity) and cultural covariates (common language, colonial ties)
are taken from the CEPII data base. We include dummies for non-reciprocal preferential trade
arrangements (NR PTAsnt), preferential trade arrangements (PTAsnt), free trade agreements,
and customs unions (FTAsnt), and the Euro-zone (EUROsnt). This data comes from Baier and
Bergstrand.
Table 1 presents pooled OLS estimations of equation (1). Odd numbered columns present
the most parsimonious model; even numbered columns include covariates related to cultural
2The dependent variable is the geometric average of trade flows between the two countries; see Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006).
3A country with per capita GDP above the 80th quantile is classified North and South else. This strategy
yields the same classification for 1990 and 2000, except for Greece. There is no data for countries from the former
USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The obtained sample is similar to that used by Beine et al. (2008).
We average the bilateral trade data over the periods 1988-1990 and 1998-2000 to reduce measurement error and
increase data availability. This has no importance for our results.
The Feenstra et al. data does not distinguish between missing and zero trade flows. Hence, we cannot empirically
distinguish between the intensive and the extensive margin of trade.
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proximity. Columns (1) and (2) disallow for elasticities to vary across educational classes.
Columns (3) to (8) estimate the pro-trade effect of single educational groups in isolation, while
columns (9) and (10) report the unconstrained version of (1).
Across all specifications, the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to distance is close to
unity. While non-reciprocal trade agreements seem to matter, preferential trade arrangements
and free trade agreements fail to show statistical significance. These are standard results which
nicely replicate Baier and Bergstrand.
Concerning the link between migration and trade we find the following: First, there is a
strong positive association between the total bilateral stock of migrants and bilateral trade. The
effect remains when considering migrants at different educational levels, see columns (3), (5),
and (7). Second, in column (9), where migration of all skill groups is accounted for, we find
that the pro-trade elasticity of high-skilled workers is almost four times bigger than that of
low-skilled workers. Surprisingly, conditional on the emigration of other skill classes, medium-
skilled individuals seem to reduce bilateral trade volumes. Third, including controls for cultural
proximity almost reduces the effects by half; compare odd and even numbered columns. Hence,
ignoring cultural proximity as a common determinant of both trade and migration leads to
upward biases estimates. However, the unexpected negative effect of medium-skilled migrants
remains, see Column (10). While these results go beyond the literature in showing the effect of
skill structure in a fairly comprehensive sample of North-South trade relations, they may still
suffer from endogeneity bias.
Table 2 presents our preferred specification where confounding factors are differenced out.
It also presents the outcome of a regression-based F-test on strict exogeneity. Since all p-values
are above 0.1, we cannot reject strict exogeneity in all specifications at conventional levels of
significance. Hence, we interpret our estimates as the causal effect of migration on trade.
The following results stand out. First, the positive link between migration and trade remains
intact for the total stock of migrants as well as for low- and high-skilled migrants, but turns
insignificant for medium-skilled migrants; see columns (1) to (4). Second, comparing even
numbered columns of Table 1 (which include additional measures of cultural proximity) and
results presented in Table 2, we find that OLS always overestimates the effect of migration on
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trade, signaling the presence of endogeneity bias. However, that bias is much smaller when the
OLS model includes measures of cultural proximity than when it does not. Third, column (5)
shows that the partial effect of medium-skilled migrants on trade is now statistically insignificant
compared to the corresponding OLS estimates in column (9)-(10) of Table 1. Here, OLS actually
seems to underestimate the true effect. While the results in column (5) suggest that the skill-
composition of migration does matter – since medium-skilled migrants do not appear to promote
trade – we cannot formally reject the hypothesis that the pro-trade elasticity of low-skilled
migrants equals the one of high-skilled.
We conclude with three remarks. First, the pro-trade effect of migration is quantitatively
important. A one-percent increase of the bilateral stock of migrants raises bilateral trade by
0.11 percent (column (1), Table 2). Since the mean bilateral migrant population in our sample
is 27,000 persons and the mean North-South trade volume is 665 mio dollar in year 2000, our
estimate implies that one additional migrant creates about 2,700 dollar in additional trade.4
Hence, the pro-trade effect of emigration is a powerful driver in overturning welfare losses from
emigration. Second, medium-skilled migrants do not foster trade. This may have to do with
the low overlap between educational classes and occupational groups: medium-skilled workers
may be predominantly employed in the non-tradeable sector. Moreover, the skill-distribution
of migrants is often bi-modular, with relatively little mass on medium-skilled workers. Third,
there are two interesting avenues for further research. Our empirical strategy provides consistent
estimates of the average elasticity of migration on trade (see Feenstra), leaving the analysis of
potential systematic differences across country pairs to future work. Moreover, one would have
to establish that a diaspora creates trade not exclusively through its effect on the preferences of
the representative consumer in the receiving country, but also through lower trade costs. This
would complete the case that the pro-trade effect of a diaspora can mitigate or even overturn
the emigration loss.
40.11× 1/27, 000× 665 mio dollar ≈ 2, 700 dollar.
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Table 2: The pro-trade effect of migrants – differenced model
Dependent variable: Geometric average of bilateral trade flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock of migrants from South in North
Total 0.112∗∗∗
(0.043)
Low-skilled 0.076∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.032) (0.040)
Medium-skilled 0.042 −0.095
(0.037) (0.065)
High-skilled 0.098∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.036) (0.056)
Trade policy
NR PTA −0.262 −0.254 −0.253 −0.266 −0.273
(0.303) (0.302) (0.301) (0.301) (0.303)
PTA 0.210∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
FTA 0.500∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.136)
EURO 0.377∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.102) (0.110) (0.109) (0.102)
Regression-based F-test for strict exogeneity
p-value 0.425 0.557 0.373 0.197 0.201
Wald test for equality of βˆh and βˆl
p-value 0.400
RMSE 0.615 0.615 0.616 0.614 0.613
R2 0.559 0.558 0.557 0.559 0.562
Notes: We cannot reject strict exogeneity of migration, and equality of βˆh and βˆl. See Table 1
for further notes.
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A Appendix
The appendix contains a detailed description of the data sources, along with a complete list
of countries included, summary statistics, and results from regressions where we restrict our
sample to countries which classify migrations by the foreign-born concept.
Data sources
Stock of foreign-born residents by educational level : Docquier and Marfouk (2006)
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/Dataset BD DocquierMarfouk.xls
Bilateral trade flows: NBER-United Nations trade data, Feenstra et al. (2005)
www.internationaldata.org/data/undata/undata.html
Geographical and cultural proximity : CEPII Institute, Paris
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
Trade policy dummies: Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
web.mac.com/baier family/iWeb/Site%202/Data.html
Summary statistics
1990 2000
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Geometric average of trade flows∗ 281 33 1215 666 50 4107
Stock of migrants from S in N 16552 1084 95364 27245 1960 201778
- Low-skilled 7167 233 54149 9748 394 96125
- Medium-skilled 3729 207 25522 7638 513 72350
- High-skilled 4999 280 24555 9397 593 48470
NR PTA 0.13 0 0.34 0.14 0 0.35
PTA 0.03 0 0.18 0.11 0 0.32
FTA 0.23 0 0.42 0.25 0 0.43
EURO 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.08
Trade flows in millions of dollar. NR PTA: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, PTA: preferential
trade arrangements, FTA: free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, EURO: common use
of the Euro.
Countries included – North
ISO Country ISO Country ISO Country
AUS Australia ESP Spain ITA Italy
AUT Austria FIN Finland JPN Japan
BEL Belgium/Luxembourg FRA France NLD Netherlands
CAN Canada GBR United Kingdom NOR Norway
CHE Switzerland GRC Greece NZL New Zealand
DEU Germany IRL Ireland SWE Sweden
DNK Denmark ISL Iceland USA United States
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Countries included – South
ISO Country ISO Country ISO Country
AFG Afghanistan GTM Guatemala OMN Oman
AGO Angola GUY Guyana PAK Pakistan
ALB Albania HND Honduras PAN Panama
ARG Argentina HTI Haiti PER Peru
BDI Burundi HUN Hungary PHL Philippines
BEN Benin IDN Indonesia PNG Papua New Guinea
BFA Burkina Faso IND India POL Poland
BGD Bangladesh IRN Iran PRT Portugal
BGR Bulgaria IRQ Iraq PRY Paraguay
BHR Bahrain JAM Jamaica ROM Romania
BLZ Belize JOR Jordan RWA Rwanda
BOL Bolivia KEN Kenya SAU Saudi Arabia
BRA Brazil KHM Cambodia SDN Sudan
BRB Barbados KIR Kiribati SEN Senegal
CAF Centr. Afr. Rep. KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis SLE Sierra Leone
CHL Chile KOR Korea SLV El Salvador
CHN China LAO Laos SOM Somalia
CIV Cote d’Ivoire LBN Lebanon SUR Suriname
CMR Cameroon LBR Liberia SYC Seychelles
COG Congo Rep. of the LBY Libya SYR Syria
COL Colombia LKA Sri Lanka TCD Chad
COM Comoros MAC China Macao SAR TGO Togo
CRI Costa Rica MAR Morocco THA Thailand
CUB Cuba MDG Madagascar TTO Trinidad and Tobago
CYP Cyprus MEX Mexico TUN Tunisia
DJI Djibouti MLI Mali TUR Turkey
DOM Dominican Republic MLT Malta TWN Taiwan
DZA Algeria MMR Burma (Myanmar) TZA Tanzania
ECU Ecuador MNG Mongolia UGA Uganda
EGY Egypt MOZ Mozambique URY Uruguay
ETH Ethiopia MRT Mauritania VEN Venezuela
FJI Fiji MUS Mauritius VNM Vietnam
GAB Gabon MWI Malawi WSM Samoa
GHA Ghana MYS Malaysia YEM Yemen
GIN Guinea NER Niger ZAF South Africa
GMB Gambia The NGA Nigeria ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.
GNB Guinea-Bissau NIC Nicaragua ZMB Zambia
GNQ Equatorial Guinea NPL Nepal ZWE Zimbabwe
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Results from our restricted sample
The classification of immigrants is not harmonized across OECD countries. Germany, Greece,
Italy, and Japan report migrants by the concept of citizenship rather than by country of birth.
Thus, the respective naturalization policies may influence our results. Our destination-and-time
effects perfectly control for non-discriminatory naturalization policies. However, they do not
suffice to capture discriminatory policies.
We restrict our sample to countries which employ the foreign-born concept, and repeat
our empirical exercise. Tables A and B respond to Tables 1 and 2 in the paper, and present
the results of the pooled OLS regressions and our differenced model, respectively. The results
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, though the negative elasticity of medium-skilled
migrants remains in our preferred specification, see column (5) of Table B.
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Table B: The pro-trade effect of migrants – differenced model
(Restricted sample)
Dependent variable: Geometric average of bilateral trade flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock of migrants from South in North
Total 0.099∗∗
(0.050)
Low-skilled 0.070∗ 0.083∗
(0.037) (0.045)
Medium-skilled 0.007 −0.124∗
(0.045) (0.071)
High-skilled 0.099∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.047) (0.068)
Trade policy
NR PTA −0.202 −0.194 −0.198 −0.212 −0.224
(0.307) (0.306) (0.306) (0.306) (0.308)
PTA 0.222∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101)
FTA 0.553∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147)
EURO 0.366∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.128)
Regression-based F-test for strict exogeneity
p-value 0.227 0.403 0.210 0.0781 0.108
Wald test for equality of βˆh and βˆl
p-value 0.430
RMSE 0.635 0.635 0.636 0.635 0.633
R2 0.535 0.535 0.533 0.536 0.539
NR PTA: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, PTA: preferential trade ar-
rangements, FTA: free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, EURO:
common use of the Euro. All variables in logs, except for dummies. Sample restricted to
countries which classify migrants by country of birth. Balanced sample of 1102 country
pairs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5,
and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include comprehensive sets of country
effects for source and destination, and a constant (all not shown). In all specifications,
we cannot reject strict exogeneity of the included migration variables at 5 percent level
of significance; see Wooldridge (2002, p. 285) for a detailed discussion of the test, and
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for a recent application. According to the Wald test, βˆh
and βˆl are not statistically different.
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